Five hundred million requests reached GGProtect and got no further. Customers never saw them, origin servers never spent a cycle on them, and no engineer was paged.
The more interesting question is what that number means.
What that traffic was
It was not one dramatic attack. Attacks like that make good screenshots, but they are a small fraction of what hits a public application.
Most of it is constant, low-grade automated noise: scanners looking for a known weakness, credential stuffing against login pages, bots scraping content, and probes checking whether a well-known vulnerability was ever patched. It runs around the clock, costs the sender almost nothing, and only has to work once.
Why blocking at the edge matters
A request your server refuses is still a request your server handled. It used a connection, some processor time and some bandwidth you paid for. Multiply that by five hundred million and your own hosting bill is funding the attacker.
GGProtect runs across 34 regions and stops this traffic near where it originates, well before your front door. Your infrastructure never sees it, and your customers never queue behind it.
The measure of a good quarter
Security done well is invisible, which makes it hard to sell and easy to underfund. When it works there is no incident to point at and no all-hands recovery to tell war stories about. The application just keeps working.
So this is our version of a war story: half a billion requests stopped at the edge, while customers spent the period thinking about their product and never had to think about their firewall.